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Religion, politics and the meaning of self-sacrifice for Tibet 
 
Introduction  
 
This paper analyses opinions of political self-sacrifice1 amongst Tibetan refugees, 
and explores their meaning for wider debates on the evolving relationship between 
religion and politics in the Tibetan national struggle. This is a particularly pertinent 
question at present, given the recent prevalence of self-immolation in Tibet and 
connected debates about whether such protests ‘belong to the religious or political 
sphere’ (Buffetrille 2012: 7). Does approval of self-sacrificial political methodology 
indicate a secularisation process (Ardley 2002), or is it simply reflective of the natural 
fluidity of religion’s political influence? This paper supports the latter position, and 
seeks to explore the current (and potential future) nature of this dynamic relationship 
further. 
 
It offers insights into the Tibetan political movement through an in-depth study of one 
refugee community. Evidence is presented from fieldwork in Dharamsala, a Tibetan 
settlement in north-western India home to the Dalai Lama and approximately eight 
thousand refugees. Local opinions about self-sacrificial political methods were 
sought over six months in 2012, through both participant observation and more 
structured methods including questionnaires and interviews (104 of each). It must be 
noted that this paper is therefore a case study of this geographical population; it 
cannot claim to represent the views of the entire Tibetan diaspora.2  Nevertheless, 
the choice of Dharamsala is reflective of its status as the hub of Tibetan politics in 
exile, being the site of the government-in-exile and the base location for most of the 
prominent activist groups’ headquarters.  
 
In terms of the paper’s structure, the first section offers a brief overview of the 
religion-politics relationship in traditional Tibetan culture. The second part then 
explores the Dalai Lama’s views of self-sacrifice, explaining why he rejects it on 
religious grounds. The third section discusses how political self-sacrifice has been 
employed by Tibetans in recent years, and considers refugees’ positive responses to 
                                                        
1 The term political self-sacrifice, also referred to as self-suffering, is used to mean harm that 
is willingly accepted, encouraged or inflicted upon the self for political purposes. This study 
refers in particular to hunger striking and self-immolation. 
 
2 Naturally, this study can make no claim to represent the ideas of Tibetans inside Tibet 
either. Political restrictions in Tibet make this type of research impossible within its borders.  
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this. The paper then moves on to pose the next logical question: should the 
increasing prevalence of political self-sacrifice therefore be considered indicative of a 
secularising process in the Tibetan context? It is argued that while this may be the 
case in activist organisations, it is not a sound interpretation for the general 
population more broadly. Furthermore, it is argued that – contrary to logical inference 
- this does not imply a straightforward reduction of faith in the Dalai Lama (or his 
politics) either.  
 
The last section of the paper considers the implications of the research findings for 
the future of resistance politics in Dharamsala. Although it is impossible to make 
definitive predictions, it is submitted that the most likely outcome is not 
secularisation, but perhaps a reconfiguring of religious ideas that maintains the 
image – if not always the philosophy – of the Dalai Lama. 
 
 
The role of religion in Tibetan politics in exile 
 
Before the incremental Chinese occupation of Tibet during the 1950s, the Tibetan 
governance system was chos-srid zung-‘brel – ‘religion and politics combined’ 
Barnett (1994: 245). For several centuries, the Dalai Lama (he has had fourteen 
incarnations so far) was ‘the only unquestioned leader of the Tibetan people’ (Kolas 
1996: 57).  This leadership continued in the government-in-exile after the current 
Dalai Lama fled Chinese-occupied Tibet in 1959, followed by many Tibetans who 
traversed the Himalayas on foot to reach sanctuary in South Asia. The Tibetan 
national struggle has been waged from Dharamsala since then, spearheaded by the 
Dalai Lama and guided by his spiritual perspective on politics. 
 
This perspective has shaped a political movement internationally famed and admired 
for its rejection of violence and its willingness to compromise. For instance, the 
fundamental goal of national independence was replaced by regional autonomy as a 
result of this perspective, and various methods popular in other nonviolent 
movements have been rejected for being coercive as opposed to being based on the 
persuasive power of friendship: even boycotts have been ruled out of the official 
methodology.3  
                                                        
3 At an audience at Cambridge University in 2013, a student asked if the Dalai Lama would 
support an economic and cultural boycott of China. He replied in the negative, stating that he 
would consider it unfair to target the Chinese masses rather than the state. ‘Better to bring 
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However, based on Tibetan refugees’ political activities during the 1990s, Jane 
Ardley (2002) argues that the increasing acceptance by Tibetans of political self-
sacrifice, which the Dalai Lama explicitly rejects, indicates that they are undergoing a 
process of political secularisation. She further submits that this could (and should) 
culminate in the removal of the Dalai Lama’s influence from people’s political thinking 
altogether, the ejection of religion from political institutions, and the subsequent 
embrace of standard nonviolent resistance methods (i.e. boycotts, civil disobedience 
and self-sacrificial methods such as hunger striking) and perhaps even violent ones 
as well (Ardley 2002).  
 
Since Ardley (2002) made these arguments, the state of chos-srid zung-‘brel has 
undergone major changes; the Dalai Lama implemented a gradual process of 
democratization in the exile polity, culminating in his official political retirement in 
2011. The government-in-exile is now headed solely by a democratically elected 
Prime Minister. Nonetheless, the government-in-exile still bases its policies on the 
Dalai Lama’s political framework; in contrast to  Ardley’s (2002) predictions, his self-
removal from politics has not yet led the new democratic government to instate an 
official demand for national sovereignty, for example. However, Ardley’s (2002) 
linkage of Tibetans’ self-sacrificial political methods with the concept of 
secularisation, and in particular with the Dalai Lama’s decreasing political relevance 
for Tibetans in exile, remains interesting. Given that her predictions were made on 
the back of limited levels of self-sacrifice in the Tibetan movement, and the fact that 
recent years have seen an unprecedented proliferation of self-sacrifice, it seems 
pertinent now to explore her arguments further.  
 
The rest of this paper will seek to respond to the idea that Tibetan refugees’ 
widespread approval of political self-sacrifice implies their recognition that religion 
‘has hindered those struggling to free Tibet’ (Ardley 2002: 166) and moreover that it 
represents an express rejection of the Dalai Lama’s political opinions, foreshadowing 
                                                        
China into the mainstream of world affairs and try to influence it on the basis of friendship’, he 
said (see http://www.dalailama.com/news/post/936-speaking-about-non-violence-and-the-
path-to-peace-and-happiness-in-cambridge). Of course, sceptics would question the extent to 
which such a statement may actually result from his awareness that international support in 
such efforts would not be forthcoming. In terms of realpolitik, therefore, it may be regarded as 
more sensible for the Tibetan leadership to reject such ideas, and in doing so to maintain the 
(internationally admired) image of Tibetans as innately friendly/non-confrontational. 
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a complete reconfiguration of Tibetan nationalism in exile. It begins now with an 
analysis of the Dalai Lama’s philosophy regarding self-suffering. 
 
 
Self-sacrifice in the Dalai Lama’s nonviolent politics 
 
A superficial reading of Buddhist philosophy immediately points to the insistence 
upon nonviolence in the Five Precepts, which are essentially the core code of 
conduct for Buddhists.4 For most interpreters, moreover, this doctrine encapsulates 
restrictions on harming one’s own body. However, beyond this basic observation 
there do exist other reasons within this religious system for rejecting self-harm. For 
example, Mahayana Buddhism (the form dominant in Tibet) teaches that the aim of 
all spiritual practitioners should be to help other sentient beings to achieve freedom 
from suffering. Clearly, becoming seriously physically compromised or even dying 
would be an obvious obstacle to that goal. Samdhong Rinpoche, a monk and two-
term former Prime Minister of the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile, is a strong 
proponent of Tibetan satyagraha.5 Nevertheless, he offers the following opinion 
about self-sacrifice:  
‘voluntary self-torture is not good. This is because the human body is 
very precious and it is the only vehicle through which we can do work. 
If that vehicle is denied of its physical and biological needs it will 
become weak… That is not permissible in the Buddhist perception’ 
(quoted in Ardley 2002: 48).  
 
Likewise, according to the Dalai Lama’s religious interpretation, the fundamental 
Buddhist concept of interdependence also helps to negate the practice of political 
self-suffering. This doctrine teaches that if I harm myself or actively encourage harm 
upon myself, then that harm will be reflected across all  sentient beings, who are 
indivisibly connected to me. Put bluntly, from the Dalai Lama’s perspective violence 
is violence irrespective of both the target (others or the self) and the form (any type of 
intentional harm is included), and it is unacceptable in political struggles. 
                                                        
4 The Precepts are a set of duties instructing Buddhists to refrain from particular actions (do 
not kill, do not take what is not willingly given, do not engage in sexual misconduct, do not 
speak falsely, do not use intoxicants). 
5  Mahatma Gandhi termed his nonviolent political approach satyagaraha, which included a 
range of methods now standard in most nonviolent resistance movements.  One essential 
component of it was self-suffering (viewed from a modernised Hindu perspective of tapas, or 
penance). For more information see Gandhi (2005); Saxena (1976). 
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All of this notwithstanding, however, Mahayana Buddhism can be interpreted to offer 
ways around these restrictions. The relevant doctrine here is that of ‘skilful means’, 
which states that ordinary codes of conduct and moral rules can be bypassed by an 
altruistic actor who seeks to benefit others. One man may be killed to save many, for 
example, and a person may sacrifice her own life in order to help others in drastic 
circumstances. Historically this doctrine has been manipulated to justify an enormous 
range of violent behaviour by Buddhists (Jerryson & Juergensmeyer 2010), including 
Japanese Zen warriors (Victoria 1997, 2010) and even terrorist groups 
(Schmithausen 1999). It was also invoked by the Fifth Dalai Lama of Tibet, who cited 
skilful means to justify his war against rival Buddhist factions (Maher 2010). 
 
However, Ives (2002) suggests that such use of the doctrine has been inherently 
inappropriate, arguing that the capacity to make such decisions lies only with 
enlightened masters. In the same vein Keown (1992) argues that skilful means are 
condoned only for the most accomplished spiritual practitioners, those who have 
overcome ego completely: 
‘the Lord has taught that what is forbidden may be performed by one 
who perceives with the eye of knowledge a special benefit to beings 
therein… But the foregoing [exemption] does not apply to everyone… 
(Shantideva, quoted in Keown 1992: 151).  
 
Other ancient Mahayana texts appear to support this argument. The Skill in Means 
Sutra states that an enlightened person’s perfect insight into shunyata (emptiness) 
prevents her from experiencing karmic retribution if she commits acts that would 
ordinarily be considered morally reprehensible. According to Keown (1992), 
Shantideva’s Siksamuccaya also states that only a bodhisattva with perfect (i.e. 
enlightened) compassion can break ordinary moral codes without suffering negative 
consequences.6  
 
Nonetheless, there are scholarly detractions from this argument (e.g. Clayton 2006), 
and it seems reasonable to conclude that the issue is not always entirely clear in the 
religious literature. There is no ‘rule book’ that Mahayana Buddhists must follow, and 
                                                        
6 6 Shantideva was an 8th century Buddhist monk, and is generally considered one of the most 
important contributors to Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. His two most important 
contributions were the Siksamuccaya and the Bodhicaryavatara, the latter of which the Dalai 
Lama (1994) has converted into a philosophical guide for modern living. 
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there tend to be subtle variations between one text and another (and even between 
commentaries on the same text). However, it can be asserted that the Dalai Lama’s 
interpretation of this issue is more in line with Keown’s (1992) than it is with Clayton’s 
(2006).  In order to demonstrate this, I would like to quote at length from an interview 
that Catherine Ingram (1990: 12-13) conducted with the Dalai Lama: 
‘CI: When you first visited Rajghat, the site of Gandhi’s memorial in 
India, you spoke of feeling a commitment to nonviolence. But I’ve 
also read a story you tell of a bodhisattva on a boat who became 
aware that a man on the boat was planning a mutiny which the 
bodhisattva knew would cause the death of hundreds of people. In 
compassion for those people, the bodhisattva killed the man who 
would have caused the death of hundreds, and thereby took on 
himself the karma of killing. 
 
DL: Of course, yes. 
 
CI: Do you think there are times when violence is the appropriate 
action? 
 
DL: …In that story, the man had…developed fully as a true 
bodhisattva. For a person such as that, the altruistic motivation is 
very, very genuine. With that kind of motivation it is possible to follow 
some kind of seemingly violent method with confidence, in order to 
help others. In my case, I am not fully developed in that kind of 
altruism. Of course, I try. And as time goes by, it is increasing… But, 
you see, I don’t have that certainty or confidence, so it is very risky. 
The more reliable, the safer thing is complete nonviolence.  
 
CI: So unless someone is a fully developed bodhisattva, then 
complete nonviolence is the better way. 
 
DL: Of course. No doubt.  
 
This conversation leaves us with no doubt about the Dalai Lama’s view of skilful 
means in relation to violence against others, and this is replicated elsewhere with 
regard to self-sacrifice. In his own discussion of Shantideva, for example, the Dalai 
Lama (1994: 48) quotes the ancient religious master as saying: 
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‘Those should not give up their body 
Whose compassion is not pure and perfect’. 
On this basis, the Dalai Lama further insists that ‘we need to protect our bodies, 
while we purify any selfish motives we may have and increase our altruistic attitude’ 
(1994: 48). 
 
Considering the fact that the Dalai Lama does not yet consider himself capable of 
this (Ingram 1990), one may safely presume that ‘ordinary’ people who venerate him 
as a spiritual leader would not be considered capable either. So where does that 
leave his nonviolent political strategy? 
 
The Dalai Lama made his feelings on political self-sacrifice very clear in 1998, when 
he visited a group of Tibetan hunger strikers outside the UN in Delhi: 
‘I told them that I admire their determination and enthusiasm. But I 
consider hunger strike unto death as a kind of violence...’ (WTNN 
1998). 
 
Similarly, in 2007 he wrote to another group of Tibetan hunger strikers attempting to 
force China into discussions of human rights violations. In a letter dated August 7th, 
thirty-one days after the beginning of that strike, the Dalai Lama commended the 
protestors on their courage. However, he went on to inform them that their actions 
were ‘a form of violence’ and urged them to end their self-imposed suffering 
immediately, insisting that ‘sacrificing the lives of more Tibetan people…is not likely 
to bring about the positive results we seek.’7 
 
 
Popular views of political self-sacrifice in Dharamsala 
 
This part of the paper now considers the views of refugees in Dharamsala, and in 
doing so it problematises the popular image of a Tibetan exile community united 
under the Dalai Lama’s political and spiritual leadership.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Tibetan government-in-exile has ruled out most direct 
action protest techniques. The Dalai Lama has understandably discouraged all 
resistance activities inside Tibetan borders, since punishments inflicted on so-called 
                                                        
7 See Thinley (2007) for the Dalai Lama’s full letter. 
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‘splittists’ by the Chinese state are known to be extremely severe (e.g. Gyatso 1997; 
TCHRD 2014). However, even in exile he has discouraged most nonviolent methods 
outlined by Gene Sharp  (1973) (the most prominent theoretician of nonviolent 
resistance), thus objecting to techniques popular with other famous religious 
nonviolent resistors (e.g. Gandhi and Martin Luther King) including boycotts or 
hunger strikes, for example. 
 
On the other hand, Tibetans have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to risk 
their lives for their country’s freedom. Inside Tibet, people have risked subtle forms of 
protest that, if recognised, could result in severe punishment (Barnett 1994). They 
have also staged open protests at several historical points (especially in the 1980s 
and in 2008), despite knowing that these would inevitably have life-threatening 
consequences (see for example Gyatso 1997; Schwartz 1994; Smith Jr. 2010). In 
exile, Tibetans’ most popular protest methods have been peaceful marches and 
candle-lit vigils. However, one activist organisation in particular – the Tibetan Youth 
Congress (TYC) - has long been willing to flout the Dalai Lama’s instruction, and has 
staged a number of hunger strikes since the 1970s. Furthermore, these have had an 
overwhelmingly positive response from the Tibetan refugee population. 
 
i) Hunger strikes  
 
The first of these was in 1977 outside the Chinese embassy in Delhi. That hunger 
strike was unexpectedly successful, leading the Indian government at the time to 
pledge support to the Tibetan independence movement. It also enjoyed widespread 
popular support, with refugees from all over India and Nepal gathering to ‘do their bit 
for the cause’ (Norbu 1998: n.p.). Nevertheless, Dharamsala’s leadership publicly 
condemned this form of action. In 1988 the TYC organised another hunger strike ‘to 
the death,’ but the Dalai Lama contacted the strikers personally, asking them to stop, 
and they did (Norbu 2008). 
 
 
The most famous of the TYC hunger strikes to date has been the 1998 strike in Delhi 
mentioned earlier, this time directed at the UN. There were six strikers, with one 
hundred more lined up to take their places if they died.  A TYC press release on 
March 16th 1998 stated: 
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‘… Considering the very nature of Non-violent struggle of the people of 
Tibet, Mahatma Gandhiji's Non-violent method of Hunger Strike is the 
only option that Tibetan people could participate [in]….’8 
 
Carole McGranahan, who was conducting fieldwork in numerous Tibetan refugee 
settlements during this hunger strike, suggests that by aligning themselves with 
Gandhi in this statement of nonviolent protest, the TYC was offering a ‘coded critique 
of the Dalai Lama’ (McGranahan 2010: 192). She also reports that the hunger 
strikers enjoyed widespread admiration amongst the general refugee population. 
Throughout India and Nepal, she recalls, Tibetan refugees knew the names and 
personal histories of all the hunger strikers. However, the 1998 hunger strike 
situation intensified on April 26th and 27th when the Indian police forcibly moved the 
strikers to hospital. On the 27th, a man named Thubten Ngodup set himself on fire in 
protest of their removal, and died from his extensive burns two days later. 
 
Afterwards, the government-in-exile encouraged Tibetans not to engage in this type 
of protest, suggesting that it would be ‘embarrassing’ for the Indian state. However, 
Ngodup was hailed a hero by Tibetans. The TYC initiated ‘Martyrs Day’ in his 
remembrance, and released a statement lauding his sacrifice:  
 ‘We salute the unwavering bravery shown by Mr. Ngodup... The Tibetan people 
have sent a clear message to the world that they are willing to sacrifice 
themselves... If the attitude and indifference and lack of support to the issue of 
Tibet continue, more blood will be shed in the coming days’ (quoted in Ardley 
2002: 50). 
The hunger strikers had attracted widespread admiration, but Ngodup’s death 
inspired an even more potent torrent of positive emotion. A memorial statue of 
Ngodup has since been erected in Dharamsala at a prominent place on the korra 
route around the Dalai Lama’s temple and residential complex,9 songs have been 
written about him, and Tibetans in North America even hold an annual basketball 
tournament in his honour (Shakya 2012a). 
 
ii) Self-immolations (2009-present)  
 
                                                        
8 See www.tyc.org; http://www.rangzen.com/archive/98/03_march/strike/strike.html 
9 Korra is religious circumambulation around a holy site.   
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For more than ten years, Ngodup remained the only self-immolating martyr for the 
Tibetan cause.10 In 2009, however, a monk inside Tibet followed Ngodup’s example 
by setting himself on fire in protest of the extreme Chinese crackdown on Tibetans 
that had followed rioting around the 2008 Beijing Olympics (see ICT 2011).11 The 
Tibetan protests in 2008 combined both violent and nonviolent methods, and the 
state’s response was severe; Tapey’s Prefecture Ngaba (in what Tibetans call the 
Amdo region) reportedly saw over twenty sixteen-year-old schoolgirls shot dead by 
the authorities, for example (Woeser 2012). When the authorities cancelled the 
mourning ceremony for these people, Tapey ran into the streets in gasoline-soaked 
robes and set himself alight. Holding up a Tibetan flag and a picture of the Dalai 
Lama, he was then shot by the police whilst on fire.  
 
Two years later, another monk self-immolated on the same spot, and was beaten to 
death by the military police. Unlike Tapey’s, however, Phuntsog’s death set in motion 
a so-called ‘epidemic’ of self-immolations which would reach epic proportions in the 
years to follow. 12  As of June 2015 there have been 141 self-immolations for the 
Tibetan cause, the vast majority of which have taken place inside Tibet. The self-
immolators have come from all backgrounds; they represent the monastic and lay 
communities, men and women, young and middle-aged. They also represent the 
entire ethnic Tibetan region.13 
 
During my fieldwork in 2012, self-immolations were occurring extremely regularly 
inside Tibet. In Dharamsala, posters and enormous banners hung on buildings and 
across streets, demonstrating through photographic evidence these people’s 
remarkable ‘sacrifice of life for Tibet.’ Members of the public had even erected one of 
                                                        
10 In 2006, a Tibetan protestor in Mumbai attempted to self-immolate in protest against Hu 
Jintao’s visit to India. Onlookers managed to put out the flames and saved his life.  
11 In March 2008, after the Chinese state blocked a peaceful march by Tibetan monks, a riot 
broke out in Lhasa. Over 150 other protests (most of which are said to have been nonviolent) 
then erupted in ethnically Tibetan areas. The government’s response involved the 
deployment of huge numbers of armed forces. Chinese statistics suggest that 19 people were 
killed in Lhasa, primarily in fires, while Tibetan organisations in exile claim that between 100 
and 218 Tibetans were killed by security forces during these demonstrations. 
 
12 The Dalai Lama originally voiced his opinion of the self-immolations in a way that reflected 
his views of hunger strikes, but as the political situation progressed, he stopped doing so 
publicly. It is possible that this change in behaviour is at least partly a result of his not wanting 
to devalue the bravery of the self-immolators, or to give their families cause to worry about 
their karma, for example. However, he does continue to plead with the public not to engage in 
these acts, focusing instead on their likely political ineffectiveness against the Chinese state.  
13 For more demographic details, see http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-
immolations-by-tibetans/ 
 11 
these posters in the Dalai Lama’s temple complex, where local community members 
and tourists go regularly to pray. There was a sense of hushed excitement in the air; 
everyone seemed to feel that these acts were going to change the Tibetan political 
situation. People spoke every day of their admiration for the bravery of these people, 
and wondered how they, in exile, could honour their memories appropriately by 
continuing their political legacy. 
 
Exiled Tibetans’ opinions of the self-immolations are reflective of Vietnamese views 
of anti-war self-immolations in 1960s Vietnam. When the first of these, Thich Quang 
Duc, doused himself in gasoline and set himself on fire at a busy intersection in 
Saigon, the western world responded with horror. Yet in a letter to Martin Luther 
King, fellow Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh described this kind of sacrifice as 
entirely nonviolent, insisting that it is not suicide but ‘an act of construction, that is, to 
suffer and die for the sake of one’s people.’14 
 
Ultimately, the central observation here is that while Tibetans in Dharamsala do 
favour nonviolent political activism, like Gandhi and Thich Nhat Hanh (the founder of 
Engaged Buddhism) they view self-sacrificial methods as being laudable and 
effective ways to pursue this. The following results from the questionnaire employed 
as part of this study sum these points up well: 
 
Fig. 1 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Not 
Sure 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Violence is 
needed to get 
results in the 
Tibetan freedom 
movement 
 
5.9% 
 
11.8% 
 
7.8% 
 
28.4% 
 
46.1% 
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
Question 
 
Violent Nonviolent 
Are hunger strikes a 
violent or nonviolent 
method of resistance? 
22.2% 77.8% 
                                                        
14 For the full text of Thich Nhat Hanh’s letter to Martin Luther King see 
http://www.aavw.org/special_features/letters_thich_abstract02.html 
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Are self-immolations a 
violent or nonviolent 
method of resistance? 
22.5% 77.5% 
 
Self-sacrificial methods are viewed as positive acts of the purest intention, aimed at 
improving the lives of all Tibetan people. 
 
Notably, Karin Fierke’s (2013) work on political self-sacrifice supports the general 
view that such acts are socially restorative, legitimating and renewing community 
dignity and cohesion. Self-sacrifice, she argues, works to reclaim the political 
capacity/authority of marginalised communities through its evocation of ‘sticky’ 
emotion, which affects both local and international audiences. Fierke (2013) 
therefore suggests that analysis of political self-sacrifice must highlight the concept of 
performativity; the ability to make a ‘speech act’ on local and global stages. ‘The 
political weapon’, she writes, ‘is injury to the body and its performance of a power of 
resistance…in which the body speaks against the power of its silencing’ (Fierke 
2013: 90, italics original). 
 
There is nothing to insist that political self-sacrifice must always be linked to religion 
in the reassertion of communitas, although Fierke (2013) underscores its common 
relationship to religious sentiment. Rene Girard, to whom Fierke (2013) refers, has 
also argued over several decades that the fundamental function of sacrifice is 
community strengthening, and that its common incorporation in religious systems is 
reflective of its capacity to achieve this. Although Fierke (2013) disagrees with some 
of Girard’s key assumptions, she notes (as he does) that as cultures have changed, 
particularly in the face of globalisation, religious practice/belief has stopped being the 
singular relevant factor leading people towards sacrificial acts. Offering multiple 
examples of political self-sacrifice, Fierke (2013) notes that while they tend to have 
religious elements, they are also motivated by factors including international human 
rights law, and the media’s (and I would add mobile technology’s) introduction of a 
global stage for the communication of stark, emotive political messages through the 
body’s most unthinkable performance. 
 
Political self-sacrifice for Tibet: is religion relevant? 
 
In both local and international understandings, Tibetan religion is tightly linked to the 
figure of the Dalai Lama (Bentz 2012).  However, considering Dharamsala residents’ 
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open appreciation of resistance techniques that the Dalai Lama rejects, the well-
established image of a unified refugee community under his leadership would appear 
to be compromised here.  Does this suggest that religion is losing relevance in this 
community’s ideas about political activism?  
Certainly for Ardley (2002), Ngodup’s self-immolation in 1998 symbolised a critical 
turn in the Tibetan struggle. In a strong and rather controversial statement at the 
time, the vice-president of the TYC announced that: 
 ‘The Dalai Lama did not achieve anything… Thousands of Tibetans in our 
homeland have now woken up and will support our type of campaign 
against China’ (quoted in Ardley 2002: 50).  
Ardley (2002) interprets such statements from activist groups as being indicative of a 
significant break with the Tibetan religious establishment and potentially also of a 
concomitant rise in militant aspirations, and she views this as entirely desirable.  
 
She is undoubtedly correct in her observation that the activist community (including 
members of the TYC and other influential organisations) inhabits a political space 
distinct from that of the religion-dominated government-in-exile. In a personal 
interview with a staff member of the TYC in Dharamsala, for example, I was told that 
to approach political issues from a spiritual perspective means that ‘you can’t 
express real opinion. The heart needs to be separate from the head.’ The all-India 
head of another prominent activist group, Students for a Free Tibet, similarly told me 
that ‘we need to differentiate religion from our politics – it’s too limiting.’ Thus, many 
activists believe that spiritual beliefs need to be kept apart from political aims and 
methods; ‘after all,’ said another TYC member, ‘compassion is not helpful in politics. 
We have to think in terms of politics: we are political refugees, not religious refugees.’  
 
The suggestion that activist organisations such as the TYC represent a significant 
break from religious influence is therefore not unreasonable. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to neglect the complexity of activists’ relationship with religion either. In 
conversation with members of a number of prominent activist organisations in 
Dharamsala including the TYC, Students for a Free Tibet and Gu Chu Sum, I was 
told that the sidelining of religious principles is a necessarily pragmatic approach to 
dealing with the current political situation, which cannot be resolved through means 
accordant with Buddhist teachings. However, they also regularly emphasised that 
this sidelining is temporary. For example: 
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‘Religion is the heart of our culture. We are forced to take steps that 
our culture does not like… in order to save that culture. Later we will 
certainly return to our traditions of peace. But first we must win that 
right by other methods.’15 
 
To suggest that the membership of these organisations is largely secular, or even in 
a straightforward process of secularisation, would therefore be somewhat 
problematic.  
 
I would like to move on now to think about the ‘ordinary’ people of Dharamsala – by 
which I mean the people who are not active members of organisations like the TYC 
or SFT. Firstly, however, consider Ardley’s (2002) analysis of the TYC’s 1998 hunger 
strike: 
 
‘In many respects the TYC’s decision to embark on the hunger strike 
has crucial implications for the future of the Tibetan struggle. The 
most important of these is the willingness of some Tibetans to break 
with the position of the Dalai Lama, and to pursue their own agenda 
by their own means. In pre-invasion Tibet, such a move would have 
been unthinkable; in exile society it is still very unusual’ (Ardley 2002: 
64). 
 
She continues: 
 
‘The hunger strike was a political act, and religious interpretations 
should not be applied. In the context of Tibetan politics, this is 
groundbreaking’ (Ardley 2002: 65). 
 
What can we infer from this about ordinary people in Dharamsala today? Firstly, this 
paper has already demonstrated that support for activities that ‘break with the 
position of the Dalai Lama’ is not in fact ‘very unusual’ at all. A substantial majority of 
ordinary people view both hunger strikes and self-immolations as meritorious 
nonviolent actions, and openly demonstrate this view with their placement of 
appreciative banners, public speeches etc. Moreover, they have been supportive of 
self-sacrificial protest for decades. Referring again to the quotations above, then, 
                                                        
15 Staff member of Gu Chu Sum, an organization for the rehabilitation of political prisoners, in 
conversation with the author. 
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does this mean that people in Dharamsala who see fit to ‘break with the position of 
the Dalai Lama’ are insinuating that ‘religious interpretations should not be applied’ to 
their politics? 
 
The answer is no. Although the Tibetan community in Dharamsala clearly favours 
methods of which the Dalai Lama disapproves, people are firm about their desire to 
preserve the centrality of religion in their politics. In response to the questionnaire 
employed for this study, for example, 74% of respondents stated that politics and 
religion should be combined.16 Further to this, it is notable that even when discussing 
the self-sacrificial methods so expressly rejected by the Dalai Lama, people still use 
religious concepts to underpin their approval.  For example, as noted above, Carole 
McGranahan (2010) reports that the 1998 hunger strikers were greatly admired. She 
quotes her own field notes, recalling her experiences of a religious candlelit 
procession in the hunger strikers’ honour: 
‘It was phenomenally moving and also frightening and 
beautiful…[Everyone] did three or four kora and then some went to a 
gonpa [monastery]…I was in a large group of people and we all had 
our candles raised high and everyone sang the Tibetan national 
anthem… there was an element of witness and testimony to it that I 
cannot quite find the right words for’ (McGranahan 2010: 195). 
Equally relevant here is her observation that people were in ‘awe in recognition of the 
sacrifice being made and the belief that if you died as a hunger striker you would 
accumulate a significant amount of [karmic] merit’ (McGranahan 2010: 194).  
Although McGranahan states unambiguously that the refugee population was aware 
of the Dalai Lama’s views on the matter, they were nevertheless supportive of the 
hunger strikers, believing them to be acting in both a moral and deeply spiritual 
fashion.17 It is remarkable that, although the Dalai Lama had clearly stated that this 
was not a Buddhist act, the refugee population nevertheless perceived it as such.  
 
Reflecting McGranahan’s (2010) findings regarding the hunger strikes, most people 
to whom I spoke in Dharamsala in 2012 also viewed self-immolation in religious 
rather than purely political terms. While members of popular activist organisations 
                                                        
16 This figure includes questionnaires completed by activists as well as non-activists. Of 
activists alone, only 46% stated that religion and politics should be combined. Although this is 
a significantly lower figure than the overall total, it is still a substantial percentage, and quite 
probably a higher figure than would be found in other communities. 
17 The latter was never claimed by members of the TYC, who continue to view their activities 
as political rather than religious.  
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often discussed the self-immolations as ‘political, not religious’ acts, the majority of 
people took a different view. Candlelit vigils and processions much like that 
described by McGranahan (2010) above were regular occurrences. Furthermore, 
when I raised the politics vs. religion distinction, the vast majority of people with 
whom I spoke referred to the Jataka Tales – particularly to the story of the Hungry 
Tigress - as ‘proof’ that political self-sacrifice is a noble and meritorious action within 
the Tibetan religious framework.18 This story is a representation of the ‘skilful means’ 
doctrine discussed earlier, and was also referred to by Thich Nhat Hanh in his letter 
justifying the Vietnamese self-immolations to Martin Luther King. It would appear that 
Tibetans in Dharamsala believe that skilful means can be used by anyone with the 
correct intention, despite the fact that the Dalai Lama says otherwise. There is no 
doubt, moreover, that the religiously appropriate image of self-immolation is furthered 
by the fact that such a high percentage of the early self-immolators were monks or 
nuns: 
‘Of the 45 cases of self-immolation reported until August 5 2012, 34 
are monks or nuns, reflecting the framing among Tibetans of monks 
as the guardians of tradition and as moral leaders’(Shakya 2012a: 
34).  
 
Tsering Shakya (2012b: n.p.) is entirely correct, therefore, when he declares that 
although ‘self-immolation as a form of protest is not intrinsically a Buddhist act any 
more than suicide bombing is an Islamic act’, ‘for co-nationals and the religious, the 
act is a statement of faith and identity.’ 19 
 
                                                        
18 The Jataka Tales are a popular collection of parables that detail the Buddha’s actions in his 
past lives, many of which describe situations in which he offered his life in order to appease 
the suffering of others. Amongst Tibetans in Dharamsala, the most popular Jataka Tale is that 
of the Hungry Tigress, which tells of a compassionate prince who offered his body as food to 
a starving tigress so that she would not have to eat her own cubs. 
19 Interestingly, Barnett (2012) and Buffetrille (2012) note that self-burning can also be 
legitimated in Buddhism through reference to the Lotus Sutra, which describes it as a 
religious offering to the Buddha. Reflecting these ideas, Lixiong’s (2012) study of 26 self-
immolators’ last words (handwritten notes, videos and verbal communication to friends and 
family) underscores an intention to make ‘acts of religious dedication’. Since the Lotus Sutra 
was traditionally popular in Chinese rather than Tibetan Buddhism, Barnett (2012) suggests 
that the self-immolators’ ideas could actually have resulted from their exposure to Chinese 
culture, which still bears marks of its traditional influences in contemporary respect for 
nationalist martyrdom, for example (see also Shakya 2012a). Notably, however, self-
immolation as religious dedication was not mentioned by Tibetans in Dharamsala  during this 
study. This discrepancy perhaps reflects the differences that exist between those living in the 
globally connected exile environment and those living inside Chinese-controlled Tibet.  
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However, although it appears that religion and politics are still tightly linked in the 
minds of Tibetans in Dharamsala, there is one further issue that must be considered 
here: ‘Shangri-la’ pressure. In a nutshell, the popular argument that Tibetans are 
‘prisoners of Shangri-la’ (Lopez 1998) emphasises the fact that, as a small group 
without resources, Tibetans cannot stand up to Chinese dominance alone, and must 
therefore depend on international support. Dependence on external actors creates a 
troubling imbalance of power; Tibetans essentially have to ‘buy’ their support by 
acting in the ways that the international community expects them to. Anand (2007) 
argues that the concept of Tibet has long offered a psychological sanctuary for 
westerners, who have consistently sought to believe in the possibility of a place of 
genuine peace on Earth (see also Lopez 1994, 1998). As long as Tibetans uphold 
this image of themselves as passive, spiritual people, they are likely to enjoy 
significant international popular support (although this has never translated into 
practical assistance by western states).  
 
With this in mind, one is left to wonder whether the fervent religiosity with which 
Tibetans in Dharamsala explain acts of self-sacrifice could be reflective of their 
desire to maintain this ‘Shangri-la’ image in the international imagination, whether it 
is a true representation of local religious belief, or whether it is – as seems most 
likely - a complex combination of both.20   
 
 
Religious politics without the Dalai Lama? 
 
At this stage in the discussion, I would now like to return to Ardley’s (2002) 
arguments about the future of this movement. She calls for the complete 
secularization of the political process, which would see the Dalai Lama maintaining a 
religious role with absolutely no political influence. The discussion above has shown 
that despite the Dalai Lama’s retirement from political affairs in 2011 (nine years after 
Ardley (2002) made her arguments), people continue to link religion with political 
activity. However, the question remains: does the fact that people do not share the 
Dalai Lama’s views on self-sacrifice, and yet still emphasize the importance of 
                                                        
20 While I believe that the religious beliefs of Tibetans in Dharamsala are genuine, this does 
not mean that other aspects of the ‘Shangri-la’ process are not operating. My experience 
does not suggest that Tibetans’ religious beliefs necessarily make them feel ‘innately’ 
nonviolent or peaceful, for example, although they do promote these images of themselves in 
order to protect their international image. This is a very complex issue that relates not only to 
political ideas but to psychology, and I cannot do justice to a discussion of it here. 
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religion in politics, mean that they are rejecting his personal influence over political 
processes? 
 
It may seem difficult to imagine how people who have complete faith in the 
omniscience of a religious figure could see fit to disregard his ideas simply because 
they refer to political issues. People in Dharamsala certainly demonstrate this type of 
faith in the Dalai Lama in their everyday religious behaviour, and the results of the 
questionnaire reinforce this observation, with 96.1% of respondents either agreeing 
or strongly agreeing with the statement ‘whatever the Dalai Lama says is correct.’ 
 
How, then, can they see fit to ignore some of his political assertions? The answer to 
this is inevitably complex. In her study of how human beings engage in political 
movements in apparently illogical ways, Wolford (2010: 25) emphasizes that we must 
add the fact that ‘people are “confused, life is complicated, emotional and uncertain” 
to our analyses of social change and mobilization’. Wolford (2010) is building here on 
Abu-Lughod’s (1993,2000) argument that social-scientific depictions of communities 
tend towards the static and homogenous, whereas they should aim to reveal the 
‘contestatory nature of discourses and social life within all communities’ (Abu-Lughod 
2000: 263). These are not discourses that compete against each other; they exist in 
parallel, finding homes in individual minds that manage to incorporate many of them 
at once, despite their opposing logics.  
 
The main issue here relates to the politics of representation, and specifically to the 
assumption that ‘other’ cultures are comprised of uncontested beliefs and ways of 
doing things. Discursive contestation is in fact fundamental to all cultural groups, and 
more importantly this is not (only) factional but internal to each person. When we 
know that people in our own communities change their views/articulations fluidly 
depending on context and mood, why do we assume that the ‘other’ does not share 
this complexity?   
 
The generalization of the ‘other’ in commentary, including academic writing, is 
located in power: its origins are in western professional, managerial and 
administrative processes that organise and control groups of ‘others’ within our own 
boundaries (e.g. the poor, women, prisoners). This, Abu-Lughod (1993) observes, is 
reflected in the social scientist’s desire to uncover the ‘truth’ about the ‘other’ – the 
search for its elusive nature, or indeed for its unwavering logic, is dehumanising and 
rooted in our desire to control.  
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Awareness of this is arguably the key to understanding how the Dalai Lama’s 
spiritual authority functions. Abu-Lughod’s (1993, 2000) insights can be linked to 
McGranahan’s (2010b) observation of the difference in the Tibetan diaspora between 
the ‘vicarious’ reverence for scripture on the one hand (and one may infer 
institutionalised religion in general, including the institution of the Dalai Lama), and 
oral forms of knowledge that structure everyday behaviour on the other. McGranahan 
(2010b) notes that while the former is valued more highly in principle, it does not 
necessarily take precedence over the more ordinary discourses that people actually 
operate with, which are necessarily fluctuating and fragmentary.  This perspective 
helps to explain Tibetans’ widespread belief in the Dalai Lama’s omniscience and 
their simultaneous capacity for everyday defiance of his discourse – albeit defiance 
at its margins (in its grey areas). Only by considering cultural functioning from this 
angle can we possibly hope to understand contradictory findings such as these, from 
the present study’s questionnaire: 
 
Fig. 3 
Question Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
I am a 
religious 
person 
53.9% 37.3% 5.9% 1% 1% 
Whatever 
HH the 
Dalai 
Lama 
says is 
correct 
74.5% 21.6% 2% 1% 1% 
 
Fig. 4 
 
Question 
 
Yes No 
Should politics and 
religion be combined? 
74% 26% 
 
 
And yet, as highlighted earlier: 
 
Fig. 5 
 
Question:  
 
Violent Nonviolent 
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Are hunger strikes a 
violent or nonviolent 
method of resistance? 
22.2% 77.8% 
Are self-immolations a 
violent or nonviolent 
method of resistance? 
22.5% 77.5% 
 
People’s support for such acts is not indicative of a widespread ignorance of their 
leader’s views, as McGranahan (2010) has already made clear. However, as the 
above results indicate, Tibetans who informed this study do not desire the Dalai 
Lama’s removal from political thought processes, but rather emphasise that they 
wish to follow his example in their political decision-making. One common way of 
rationalising this apparent lack of coherence is revealed in common statements like 
this one: 
‘His Holiness must be right. But we are not all so perfect as he is. So 
we can only do what we can.’ 
People therefore acknowledge that anything the Dalai Lama advocates (or does not) 
must be correct, but in recognizing their own human frailties, they also accept that 
they are not always capable of living up to his standards. They forgive themselves, in 
other words, for their need to act in ways that reflect their own comparative spiritual 
inadequacies. 
 
A further point to be made here, however, relates to a general vagueness in 
Dharamsala about the Dalai Lama’s reasons for discouraging self-sacrificial 
methods. Although I presented this reasoning earlier in the article, he does not go 
into detail about it in ordinary and accessible public forums. It is not to be found in his 
public speeches, for example, but rather must generally be sought within his more 
philosophical writings.21 On the other hand, the Dalai Lama is vocal about his 
admiration for Gandhi (who personally lauded political self-suffering), without ever 
discussing their philosophical differences. For many people thinking about nonviolent 
resistance, therefore, to refer to Gandhi’s logic is often thought to be essentially the 
                                                        
21 We can only speculate on the reason behind the Dalai Lama’s decision not to explain his 
reasoning in detail publicly. As noted earlier, his first reactions to the self-immolations 
mirrored his response to the hunger strikes: they were brave acts but ultimately they were 
violent (and thus undesirable) ones. In Jamyang Norbu’s (2012: n.p.) words, ‘he gave the 
impression that it wasn’t a Buddhist thing to do.’ As the self-immolations grew in number, 
however, his public pronouncements became more muted. He shifted to focus on the positive 
intentions of the self-immolators, and stopped referring to the violence of their acts (although 
he continued to plead with Tibetans not to self-immolate). As noted earlier, this is perhaps 
because the topic is an extremely sensitive one, and families and friends of self-immolators 
would be greatly impacted by an outright pronouncement of disapproval. . 
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same as referring to the Dalai Lama’s. For example, Al Jazeera journalists asked 
Tibetans in India: ‘Isn't setting oneself on fire a violent action - something 
unacceptable in Tibetan Buddhism, which strictly advocates non-violence?’ They 
quote a Tibetan refugee in response:  
‘Burning oneself for the freedom of six million Tibetans cannot bring 
negative karma. They do it for a selfless cause. So this is not against 
Buddhist beliefs…Gandhi also declared hunger strike unto death on 
many occasions. Does that make him violent? In every freedom 
struggle, violent or non-violent, people lose a part of themselves to 
attain a larger goal’ (Gaedtke & Parameswaran 2012: n.p.). 
Indeed, the popularity of Gandhi’s picture in shops/offices etc. is second only to the 
Dalai Lama’s in Dharamsala, and everyone is aware of the Dalai Lama’s great 
respect for the Indian leader. It is fairly straightforward, therefore, for people to set 
aside the Dalai Lama’s anti-sacrifice message by assuming that it results from his 
innate kindness/compassion rather than from core doctrinal disagreements with 
Gandhi. Take the following quote from one of my interviews, for example: 
‘It is true that [the Dalai Lama] does not prefer self-immolation as a 
method. This is because he is so compassionate, he is the loving 
Chenrezig [the bodhisattva of compassion]. He cannot bear to see 
people suffer. But it is a great merit what these people have done.’ 
 
However, while the vagueness of the Dalai Lama’s reasoning about political self-
sacrifice allows for this type of digression from his views, there are other issues that 
do not lend themselves so easily to it. For example, Ardley (2002) also argued that 
the implementation of secular democracy would enable exiled Tibetans to replace 
the Dalai Lama’s goal of regional autonomy with national independence, and she 
implied that they would certainly do so. This has not proven true so far; the official 
position has not changed since the Dalai Lama’s retirement. According to this study, 
the majority of people in Dharamsala do believe that Tibet deserves to be an 
independent country:  
 
Fig. 6 
Choose one of the following 
options: 
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Tibet should be a completely 
independent country 
56.1% 
Tibet should have meaningful 
autonomy within China 
31.6% 
Tibet should be the same as any 
other Chinese state 
11.2% 
Nothing needs to change 1% 
 
However, those holding this view also regularly state that pursuing this goal would 
not be advisable. Some give practical reasons for this: 
‘If we waited another 50 years to get independence, everything we are 
fighting for - culture, religion, language - might be lost anyway.’ 
Many, however, simply acknowledge that while they would instinctively prefer 
independence, they trust the Dalai Lama’s opinion and therefore will continue to 
support meaningful autonomy.  
 
Thus,  Ardley (2002: 66)’s statement that ‘the hunger strike in 1998 [and by 
association the recent support for self-immolation] is evidence of …an increasing 
willingness to flout the Dalai Lama’s stance on non-violence’ is only partly correct. 
The word ‘increasing’ is certainly problematic, considering the long-term and 
widespread positive responses to hunger strikes. Furthermore, it must also be 
emphasized that as far as the non-activist population goes, the ‘willingness to flout 
the Dalai Lama’s stance on non-violence’ extends only to subtle interpretations of 
what constitutes nonviolence, and not to a willingness to reject nonviolence 
altogether (see Fig. 1 above). Because the Dalai Lama has been so clear about the 
need for nonviolence, the vast majority of people are unwilling to compromise on this. 
Crucially, their continued insistence on nonviolence is a consequence of the Dalai 
Lama’s teachings rather than just their own strategic judgment. The interviews 
conducted for this study asked people if they would support the Dalai Lama if he 
decided to advocate violence, and 70% of respondents said that they would. People 
are clearly still guided by the Dalai Lama’s opinions, therefore, despite the official 
democratization of the political process. 
 
The relevance of the Dalai Lama to Tibetan politics is likely to remain strong. Not 
only do Tibetans in Dharamsala have deep spiritual faith in the Dalai Lama, but they 
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also view him as the ‘glue’ in their national struggle. The political situation requires a 
unified Tibetan population in exile, and the Dalai Lama, as a traditional institution as 
well as a man, ‘has far-reaching effects in terms of social cohesion – that is, to the 
idea that those who adopt, understand and use the same symbol can identify as 
members of the same community’ (Bentz 2012: 291). Indeed, scholars including 
Bentz (2012) Kolas (1996) and Avedon (1984) remind us of the popular myth of 
Tibetan origin, in which the Dalai Lama in a prior incarnation as a monkey fathered 
the first Tibetans. He is therefore a symbol of Tibetanness that extends not only to 
religious authority but to the very existence of Tibetans as a people. In other words, 
the Dalai Lama ‘not only provides continuity to the history of Tibet, but epitomises the 
community of Tibetans itself ‘(Kolas 1996: 57). Indeed, although most people in 
Dharamsala claim to have deep spiritual faith in the Dalai Lama, even people who do 
not focus on this still recognize the role that he plays in keeping the community 
together. As a member of Students for a Free Tibet emphasized tome,  ‘Religion and 
politics may not mix well as of right now, but… The Dalai Lama is the unifying force 
for Tibetans.’ Thus, the Dalai Lama is not just a symbol of religious identity but a 
symbol of Tibet itself. This operates in the international sphere (he is, after all, the 
globally-recognized figurehead of this movement to liberate ‘Shangri –la’), but also in 
the domestic arena in exile, where Tibetan refugees struggle to maintain a collective 
identity in an environment where foreign influences abound, and the diaspora is 
increasingly scattered.  
 
Conclusions: the future of the religion-politics relationship in Dharamsala 
 
As this paper draws to a conclusion, it will now reflect upon what the arguments and 
findings above imply for the future of Tibetan politics in exile. With the wisdom that 
hindsight now offers, it is easy to be doubtful of Ardley’s (2002: 147) argument that 
democratization means that ‘religion would be removed from practical political 
affairs.’ The reality is that people in Dharamsala continue to seek religious 
justifications for political acts, perhaps especially when they appear to be in breach of 
other religious pronouncements.  
 
It also seems reasonable to reject outright the idea that the Dalai Lama could 
somehow be ejected from the political imagination in Dharamsala. While counter-
discourses may be invoked to allow people to sidestep some of his pronouncements, 
other discourses are simultaneously maintained to preserve his position as an 
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honoured spiritual leader – a ‘God King’, as he is often called. Critically, his position 
is not just that of a figurehead, but rather it is one that inspires deep religious and 
community sentiment in the population of Dharamsala – two things that are 
inextricably connected. While it may seem irrational for people to have such a depth 
of faith in the Dalai Lama whilst simultaneously appearing to ignore some of his 
political judgements, this must be accepted as an element of the natural fluidity of 
human cultural instinct. 
 
It must be emphasised, moreover, that the apparent disregard for some of the Dalai 
Lama’s views is located only in the grey areas of his discourse. The Tibetan leader’s 
failure to be consistently explicit in public forums about his reasons for rejecting self-
sacrifice creates these grey areas, leaving space for followers to (re)interpret his 
more general statements without explicitly challenging his traditional authority. 
Indeed, it seems likely that these fluid spaces are crucial to the entire relationship 
between faith and activism in this context.  
 
Faith-based politics (in many instances, at least) is characterised by a combination of 
clear guidelines with pockets of intangibility: an instinctive yet non-elucidated sense 
of connection that skirts analytical process. Logic is neither necessary nor is it sought 
in this space, and it is for this reason that humans – Abu Lughod’s (1993) ‘confused, 
complicated and emotional’ beings – can maintain a depth of faith that eludes 
academic comprehension, whilst occasionally acting and thinking in ways that seem 
to contradict their religious associations. In relation to Tibetan refugees I have argued 
that when issues are not locatable in these fluid, grey areas - where the choice would 
be starker (‘I support the Dalai Lama or I do not’ – e.g. the rejection of nonviolence in 
toto) - popular choices remain in favour of adhering to the Dalai Lama’s views. 
 
A related issue, and one more difficult to address, is what will happen after the Dalai 
Lama dies. At present he enjoys good physical and mental health, but at eighty 
years old he is nevertheless in the latter stages of life. The Dalai Lama has 
observed with sadness the fact that some people adhere to his methods as a 
marker of reverence to him, but may choose other paths after his death (cf. Kazmin 
2013). Once he dies, it is also possible that the teachings of previous Dalai Lamas, 
including those of his immediate predecessor (who supported violence under certain 
circumstances) could also be re-invoked. Once the current Dalai Lama is no longer 
there to remind people regularly of his own views, it will certainly become easier for 
them to cling to counter discourses that legitimate alternative political methods 
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within the broader cultural framework. Given the current trend, moreover, this seems 
distinctly likely. 
 
If I were to predict a likely trajectory for this movement, it would be an increasing 
movement towards Gandhian methods within the broader framework of Tibetan 
Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is likely to maintain the positions of an object of worship 
and a symbolically unifying institution, but it seems likely that his rejection of 
common resistance methods that Gandhi favoured, including self-sacrifice and even 
extending to coercive tactics such as economic boycotts, may well be ‘forgotten’ or 
explained away after his death. The Dalai Lama’s admiration for Gandhi, combined 
with an alternative view of skilful means that could permit virtually any form of 
political action with ‘altruistic’ intent (just as Gandhi could justify most acts if they 
were in the pursuit of ‘Truth’) has the potential to change how religion and politics 
interact here in future, while simultaneously preserving the orientalist images of 
Tibet necessary for international support. However, whether this could ultimately 
extend to the rejection of the Dalai Lama’s central political positions (Ardley 2002) 
remains to be seen. At this point in time, it can only be concluded that the current 
prevalence and support of self-sacrifice does not indicate a secularisation process of 
Tibetan politics in exile, and nor does it indicate a truly significant move away from 
the Dalai Lama’s political influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (1993) Writing Women’s Worlds. Berkeley, LA & London: University of 
California Press. 
 
Abu-Lughod, L. (2000) ‘Locating Ethnography.’ Ethnography 1 (2), pp. 261-267. 
 
Anand, D. (2007) Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
 
Ardley, J. (2002) The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian 
Perspectives. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Avedon, J. (1984) In Exile from the Land of Snows. London: Michael Joseph. 
 
 26 
Barnett, R. (1994) ‘Symbols and Protest: The Iconography of Demonstrations in Tibet 1987 -
1990’ in Barnett, R. & S. Akiner (eds.) Resistance and Reform in Tibet.  London: Hurst & 
Company. 
 
Barnett, R. (2012) ‘Political Self-Immolation in Tibet and Chinese Popular Culture.’ Revue 
d’Etudes Tibétaines 25, pp. 41-64. 
 
Bentz, A-S. (2012) ‘Symbol and power: the Dalai Lama as a charismatic leader.’ Nations and 
Nationalism 18 920, pp. 287-305. 
 
Buffetrille, K. (2012) ‘Self-Immolation in Tibet: Some Reflections on an 
Unfolding History.’ Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 25, pp.1-17. 
 
Clayton, B. (2006) Moral Theory in Santideva’s Siksamuccaya. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Dalai Lama (1994) A Flash of Lightening in the Dark of Night: A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s 
Way of Life. Boston: Shambhala Publications Inc. 
 
Fierke, K.M. (2013) Political Self-Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International 
Relations (Kindle Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Gaedtke, F. & Parameswaran, G. (2012) ‘Tibet’s Burning Protest.’ Al Jazeera. Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/05/201253192951400741.html (accessed 
05/06/14). 
 
Gandhi, M.K. (2005) ‘On Satyagraha’ in Holmes, R.L. & Gan, B.L. Nonviolence in Theory and 
Practice. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc. 
 
Gyatso, P. (1997) Fire Under the Snow: Testimony of a Tibetan Prisoner. London: The Harvill 
Press. 
 
ICT (International Campaign for Tibet) (2011) ‘Powerful video footage, images of armed 
crackdown in 2008 across Tibet; Eyewitness account of militarization of Lhasa today.’ 
Available at: http://www.savetibet.org/powerful-video-footage-images-of-armed-crackdown-in-
2008-across-tibet-eyewitness-account-of-militarization-of-lhasa-today/#sthash.KaEjTknF.dpuf 
(accessed 09/05/13). 
 
 
Ingram, C. (1990) In the Footsteps of Gandhi. Berkeley: Parallax Press. 
 
Ives, C. (2002) ‘Dharma and Destruction: Buddhist Institutions and Violence.’ Contagion: 
Journal of Violence, Mimesis and Culture 9, pp.151: 174. 
 
Jerryson, M. & Juergensmeyer, M. (eds.) (2010) Buddhist Warfare. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Kazmin, A. (2013) ‘An Exclusive Interview with the Dalai Lama.’ Financial Times. Available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d49d13aa-4749-11e3-b4d3-00144feabdc0.html#slide0 (accessed 
03/12/14). 
 
Keown, D.V. (1992) The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Palgrave. 
 
Khazan, O. (2012) ‘China: Self-immolators and their abettors will be charged with murder.’ 
The Washington Post. Available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/06/china-self-immolators-and-
their-abettors-will-be-charged-with-murder/ (accessed 01/02/15). 
 
Kolas, A. (1996) ‘Tibetan nationalism: the politics of religion’. Journal of Peace Research 33 
(1), pp.51–66. 
 
 27 
 
Lixiong, W. (2012) ‘Last-words analysis – Why Tibetans Self-immolate.’ Phayul. Available at: 
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=32726 (accessed 12/06/14). 
 
Lopez, D. S. Jr. (1998) Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West. Chicago: 
University if Chicago Press. 
 
Maher, D.F. (2010) ‘Sacralized Warfare: The Fifth Dalai Lama and the Discourse of Religious 
Violence’ in Jerryson, M. & Juergensmeyer, M. (eds.) Buddhist Warfare. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
McGranahan, C. (2010) Arrested Histories: Tibet the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War. 
Durham & London: Duke University Press. 
 
McGranahan, C. (2010b) ’Narrative Dispossession: Tibet and the Gendered Logics of 
Historical Possibility.’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 52 (4), pp. 768-797. 
 
Norbu, J. (1986) [1979] Warriors of Tibet: The Story of Aten and the Khampas’ Fight for the 
Freedom of their Country. London: Wisdom Publications. 
 
Norbu, J. (1998) ‘Rite of Freedom: The Life and Sacrifice of Thupten Ngodup.’ Phayul. 
Available at: http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=6853 (accessed 29/11/15) 
 
Norbu, J. (2008) ‘Remembering Thubten Ngodup.’ Shadow Tibet (blog). Available at: 
http://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2008/05/12/remembering-thupten-ngodup/ (accessed 
01/11/14). 
 
Norbu, J. (2012) ‘Self-immolation and Buddhism.’ Shadow Tibet (blog). Available at: 
http://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2012/01/03/self-immolation-and-buddhism/ (accessed 
28/11/15). 
 
Saxena, S.K. (1976) ‘The Fabric of Self-Suffering: A Study in Gandhi.’ Religious Studies 12 
(2), pp. 239-247. 
 
Schmithausen, L. (1999) ‘Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude Towards War’ in Houben, J.E.M. & 
Van Kooij, K.R. (eds.) Violence Denied: Violence, Nonviolence and the Rationalization of 
Violence in South Asian Cultural History. Leiden: Brill.  
 
Schwartz, R.D. (1994) Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising. London: Hurst 
& Company. 
 
Shakya, T. (2012a) ‘Transforming the Language of Protest.’ Cultural Anthropology Online. 
Available at: http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/94-transforming-the-language-of-protest 
 
Shakya, T. (2012b) ‘Self Immolation, the Changing Language of Protest in Tibet.’ Revue 
d’Etudes Tibétaines 25, pp.19-40. 
 
Sharp, G. (1973) The Politics of Non-Violent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent. 
 
Shiromany, A.A. (ed.) (1998) The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama: 
Selected Speeches and Writings. New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research 
Centre. 
 
Smith Jr., W. (2010) Tibet’s Last Stand? Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Sperling, E. (1994) ‘The Rhetoric of Dissent: Tibetan Pamphleteers’ in Barnett,R. & S. Akiner 
(eds) Resistance and Reform in Tibet . London: Hurst and Co. 
 
 
 28 
TCHRD (2014) Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report. Available at: 
http://www.tchrd.org/category/annual-reports/ (accessed 01/06/15). 
TCHRD (Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy) (2012) ‘Full text of official 
notification punishing Tibetan self-immolations.’ Available at: 
http://www.tchrd.org/2012/11/full-text-of-official-notification-punishing-tibetan-self-
immolations/ 
 
Thinley, P. (2007) ‘The Dalai Lama calls on Tibetans to end hunger strike: Day 31.’ Phayul. 
Available at: http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=17493 (accessed 12/03/2015). 
Victoria, B. (1997). Zen at War. New York: Weatherhill. 
 
Victoria, B. (2010) ‘A Buddhological Critique of “Soldier-Zen” in Wartime Japan’ in Jerryson, 
M. & Juergensmeyer, M. (eds.) Buddhist Warfare. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Woeser (2012) ‘Remembering the first person who self-immolated inside Tibet, Tapey.’ 
Invisible Tibet (blog). Available at: http://woeser.middle-way.net/2012/02/blog-post_13.html 
(original Chinese version) or http://highpeakspureearth.com/2012/remembering-the-first-
person-who-self-immolated-inside-tibet-tapey-by-woeser/ (English translation). 
 
Wolford, W. (2010) This Land is Ours Now: Social Mobilization and the Meaning of Land in 
Brazil. Durham & London: Duke University Press.  
 
WTNN (World Tibet Network News) (1998) ‘India- Tibetan Protest.’ Available at: 
http://www.tibet.ca/en/library/wtn/archive/old?y=1998&m=4&p=2_3 (accessed 15/06/15). 
 
